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Rethinking the Digital Remix: Mash-
ups and the Metaphysics of Sound 
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David J. Gunkel 
Critical evaluations of audio mash-ups and remixes tend to congregate around two poles.  On the one
hand, these often clever recombinations of recorded music are celebrated as innovative and creative
interventions in the material of bland commodity culture.  On the other hand, they are often reviled as
derivative, inauthentic, and illegal because they do nothing more than appropriate and reconfigure the
intellectual property of others.  This essay does not side with either position but identifies and critiques
the  common  understanding  and  fundamental  assumptions  that  make  these  two,  opposed  positions
possible in the first  place.  The investigation of this matter is divided into two main parts.  The first
considers  the  traditional  understanding  of  technologically  enabled  reproduction  and  the  often
unquestioned value it  invests in the concept of originality.  It does so by beginning with a somewhat
unlikely  source,  Plato's  Phaedrus—a  dialogue  that,  it  is  argued,  originally  articulates  the  original
concept  of originality that both determines and is reproduced in the theories and practices of sound
recording.  The second part of the essay demonstrates how the audio mash-up deliberately intervenes in
this  tradition,  advancing  a  fundamental  challenge  to  the  original  understanding  and  privilege  of
originality.  In making this argument, however, the essay does not endeavor to position the mash-up as
anything  unique  or  innovative.   Instead,  it  demonstrates  how  mash-ups,  true  to  their  thoroughly
derivative nature, plunder, reuse, and remix anomalies that are already available in and constitutive of
recorded music.
The record, not the remix, is  the anomaly today. The remix is the very nature  of the
digital.   Today,  an endless,  recombinant,  and fundamentally  social  process  generates
countless  hours  of  creative  product  (another  antique  term?)…The  recombinant  (the
bootleg, the remix, the mash-up) has become the characteristic pivot at the turn of our
two centuries (Gibson, 2005: 118).
Although  the  audio  mash-up1 is  a  relatively  new development  in  popular  music,  its  cultural  history
appears  to  be  already pre-determined,  programmed,  and prescribed.   The  narrative  trajectory  of  this
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history, like the one that has been written for almost every innovation in pop music (e.g., jazz, rock 'n'
roll, punk, rap, P2P, etc.), follows a rather well worn and recognizable path.  Once upon a time, these
narratives usually read, there was a revolutionary underground movement that sought to challenge the
status quo.  Mash-ups—a bastard art form created by the illegitimate appropriation and fusion of two or
more audio recordings—were patently illegal, deliberate subversions of authority in the culture industry,
and critical interventions in the very material of popular music.   This part of the story is always and
unapologetically  imbued with an unquestioned validation of democratic ideals,  revolutionary politics,
and utopian pretensions: the people effectively challenge and circumvent the hegemony of multinational
corporations,  passive  consumers  of  mass  media  content  become inventive  and active  producers,  and
bland commodity culture becomes repurposed for new and unthinkable ends.  Take for example, what is
routinely considered to be the apex of "the mash-up revolution" (Cruger, 2003), DJ Danger Mouse's (aka
Brian Burton)  The Grey Album (2004), a digital concatenation of rap lyrics extracted from Jay-Z's  The
Black Album (2003) and music plundered from one of the undisputed classics of "classic  rock"—the
Beatles 1968 The White Album (The Beatles).  The result of this unlikely combination was regarded as
nothing less than revolutionary (see, for instance, Cruger, 2003 and Gunderson, 2004).  And its impact is
easily measured by considering the response of the established order,  namely EMI, who immediately
mobilized extant intellectual property law and issued a now-famous cease-and-desist letter.  In response
to  this  corporate  backlash,  170  websites  participated  in  a  coordinated  online  protest  dubbed  "Grey
Tuesday," in which mp3 copies of the mash-up were freely distributed over the Internet.2
But  then  things  change.   The  traditional  powerbrokers,  who  initially  and  somewhat
unsuccessfully tried to put an end to the practice, now co-opt the revolution and transform the innovation
to serve their  own interests.   In the process, a "revolutionary art  form" such as the mash-up becomes
domesticated and reinvested.  Whatever critical interventions it might have deployed are now made to
serve the system it  was to  have subverted,  and what had been an outlaw underground movement  is
repackaged,  repurposed,  and  retailed  as  a  legitimate  corporate  product.   If  the  apex of  the  mash-up
revolution was The Grey Album, its commodification and reappropriation followed immediately and also
involved, some might say "ironically," rapper Jay-Z.  Shortly after the appearance of The Grey Album and
the contentious intellectual property disputes that followed, MTV plundered and repackaged the entire
concept.  Under the somewhat ham-fisted title  MTV Ultimate Mash-up Presents: Collision Course, the
lyrics of Jay-Z were layered on top of the music of Linkin Park.  Unlike The Grey Album, however, this
recombination had the blessing of both the artists and the record companies.  Although a considerable
commercial success (the CD topped the Billboard 200 one week after its release), many critics regarded
this  "authorized"  version  as  less  than  interesting.   A  few  months  later  David  Bowie  (along  with
automaker Audi) got into the re-mix, sponsoring a mash-up contest of his own material; Bowie retained
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all rights to the final product and the winner, David Choi, received an Audi TT coupe for his efforts.3
And in January of 2005 Wired magazine made the proclamation "Mash-ups go Mainstream" in an article
that profiled Mark Vidler's artist-authorized mash-up of Madonna and the Sex Pistols in "Ray of Gob"
(Orlov,  2005:  72).   Since  then,  Vidler's  creations  have  been  heard  on  the  HBO  television  series
Entourage (season 3, episode 28) and have been officially distributed by EMI records (the same company
which sought to litigate against The Grey Album) on the 2007 release Mashed, the first "legal" mash-up
CD.4
By this  time these histories take on a kind of "paradise lost" feel,  and critics  lament that the
revolution  has  lost  its  initial  bite,  the  innovation  has  become somewhat  trite,  and  the  practice  risks
becoming just another short-lived, pop-culture trend.  We know the contours of this story all too well.  It
is the narrative that is imposed on all  revolutionary innovations whether political, cultural,  or artistic.
And as long as we operate on this terrain we already know what is possible, what questions can be asked,
and what outcomes are appropriate.  Both advocates and critics of the mash-up fit their accounts to this
narrative structure in one way or another.  Advocates complain about the corporate appropriation and
recall fondly the "more original and authentic" past, while critics point out how this innovation is really
nothing new and can be easily situated within the established order.  The problem, however, is not with
the appropriation  as such;  the problem, I would argue,  is  with  the  narrative itself.   In fact,  it  is  the
imposition of this narrative structure and its metaphysical investment in originality and authenticity that
is the site of a larger and more insidious co-optation.  If we are to understand the mash-up and its cultural
significance, we will need to learn to think outside the box, that is, outside the traditional configuration
that has already been imposed upon our thinking by this narrative and its metaphysical and axiological
assumptions.  We need, in other words, to learn to hear the mash-up as a critical intervention in and
fundamental reconfiguration of the very concepts of originality and authenticity that, for better or worse,
already structure our comprehension of and expectations for recording technology.5 
For the Record: The Original Metaphysics of Recording
Most  persons  are  surprised,  and  many  distressed,  to  learn  that  essentially  the  same
objections  commonly  urged  today  against  computers  were  urged  by  Plato  in  the
Phaedrus (274-7) and in the Seventh Letter against writing (Ong, 1995: 79).
Let's  begin  at  the  beginning,  with  what  is  considered  to  be  the  first  recorded  account  of  recording
technology—Plato's Phaedrus.  Although the Phaedrus is often determined to be about rhetoric and the
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art  of  speaking,  it  is  a  dialogue  that  is,  from  the  very  start,  concerned  with  the  techniques  and
technologies of recording, recollection, and reproduction.  It commences with a book by which Phaedrus
succeeds in luring Socrates away from his proper place. 
"You see," Socrates explains, "I am fond of learning.  Now the country places and the
trees won"t teach me anything, and the people in the city do.  But you seem to have
found a drug to bring me out.  For as people lead hungry animals by shaking in front of
them a  branch  of  leaves  or  some fruit,  just  so,  I  think,  you,  by  holding  before  me
discourse in books, will lead me all over Attica and wherever else you please" (Plato,
1982: 230d-e).  
At the beginning of the dialogue, Phaedrus gets Socrates interested in a book, and Socrates, something of
a discourse fan, will do anything to get his hands on it.  He will even leave the walls of his beloved city
and venture into what he considers a "bad neighborhood."6  The book in question is the transcript of a
speech recently delivered by the well-known orator Lysias, and Socrates, who was absent on the day of
its presentation, is anxious not only to hear an account of what had been said but to have access to the
"actual discourse" (Plato, 1982: 228e) as recorded in writing and reproduced through reading.  At the
beginning of the Phaedrus, therefore, writing is situated as a means for recording speech and reproducing
it at a future time and in a different place than that of its original delivery.  This particular understanding
is  eventually  thematized  at  the  dialogue's  end,  where  Socrates  and  Phaedrus  explicitly  take  up  and
investigate the art or τέχνη of writing.7   The examination begins with Socrates recounting a story he has
heard concerning two Egyptian gods, Thueth the inventor and Thamus the king, and concludes with what
is now a rather famous indictment of writing that, according to theorists as different as Jacques Derrida
(1981a) and Neil Postman (1993), has been constitutive of the Western tradition.8
Writing has this strange quality, and is very like painting; for the creatures of painting
stand like living beings, but if one asks them a question, they preserve a solemn silence.
And so it is with written words; you might think they spoke as if they had intelligence,
but if you question them, wishing to know about their sayings, they always say only one
and the same thing.  And every word, when once it is written,  is  bandied about alike
among those who understand and those who have no interest in it, and it knows not to
whom to speak or not to speak; when ill-treated or unjustly reviled it always needs its
father to help it; for it has no power to protect itself (Plato, 1982: 275d-e).
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This formulation has a number of consequences for the way we understand writing in particular
and recording technology in general.  First, writing, as a technology of recording, is secondary in both
temporal sequence and status.  The written record is, according to the Socratic account, subsequent to
and derived from an  original  spoken  performance.   In this  way,  writing  is  situated  as  the  proxy of
something else from which it  is  derived and to which it  refers and defers.   And Socrates marks this
difference by employing a metaphor that is, in a manner of speaking, a matter of life and death.  Speech,
Plato has Socrates say, is alive insofar as it is animated by the breath of a living speaker; while writing,
which utilizes artificial and external apparatus, is dead and lifeless (1982: 276a).  Or as Derrida neatly
summarizes it with reference to the mythical story, "the god of writing must also be the god of death…
[writing]  substitutes  the  breathless  sign  for  the  living  voice"  (1981a:  91).   This  particular
conceptualization also determines, whether it is explicitly identified as such or not, the understanding and
evaluation  of  subsequent  forms  of  recording  technology,  especially  the  phonographic  record.   The
English word "record" is derived from the verbal infinitive "to record" and gives one the impression that
what is inscribed on the surface of a wax cylinder or vinyl disk is the transcription of some original audio
event.   "On this  account,"  James Lastra writes,  "phonography transcribes  sonic events  that  (although
staged  for  the  device)  are  fully autonomous of  it.   Notionally,  these  events  would have occurred in
exactly  the  same  manner  were  the  phonograph  not  present.   In  other  words,  phonography  did  not
“penetrate” the event in any manner but sought instead merely to duplicate it from the outside" (2000:
85).  
This particular understanding of phonographic reproduction as external and secondary permeates
the  history  of  recorded  sound,  affecting  professional  practices,  theorizing,  and  even  common
understanding.  It is, for example, deployed in and popularized by Thomas Edison's early writings on the
phonograph. According to Edison, this device facilitated "the captivity of all  manner of sound waves
heretofore  designated  as  “fugitive,”  and  their  permanent  retention"  (1878:  528).   For  Edison  the
phonograph was understood and promoted as a device of audio documentation.  It was, quite literally, a
recording technology that was to capture, transcribe, and store original sounds.  This understanding is
also operative in contemporary practices and is especially evident in moments of crisis, like the Milli
Vanilli scandal.  In 1990, the pop duo Milli Vanilli was awarded the Best New Artist Grammy for 1989.
The award was rescinded, however, when it was revealed that the two "recording artists" did not actually
perform the music that was recorded on their award-winning record.  This practice, which is, we should
note, not uncommon in popular music9, became a scandal, because it was assumed by both the public and
the National Academy of Recording Arts and Sciences (the institutional sponsor of the Grammy Awards)
that a record records the performance of a musician and that it is the original performance ("the referent,"
to use language borrowed from semiology) and not its recorded representation that is of ultimate value
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and importance.  And as with the Phaedrus, the difference here is marked by employing biological terms.
"Live" performance is commonly distinguished from and given preference over recorded reproductions,
which are, on this account, assumed to be secondary, derivative, and lifeless.  "The common assumption"
as Philip Auslander argues, "is that the live event is “real” and that mediatized events are secondary and
somehow artificial reproductions of the real" (1999: 3).
Second, as an external, inanimate, and artificial reproduction, writing is able to preserve speech
after and beyond the time and place of its original delivery.  This is both an advantage and a problem.  It
is advantageous insofar as recording provides an inalterable and permanent document of something that
is essentially transitory and ephemeral.  This is what makes the book so attractive for Socrates, it records
and stores up the speech of Lysias.  The same is true of the phonographic record, which does not just
record the words but also their particular inflection, timbre, and rhythm.  According to Jonathan Sterne,
"from the moment of its public introduction, sound recording was understood to have great possibilities
as an archival  medium.  Its  potential  to preserve  sound indefinitely into the  future  was immediately
grasped by users and publicists alike" (2005: 288).  And again it all comes down to a matter of life and
death.  "If there was," Sterne points out, "a defining figure in the early accounts of sound recording, it
was the possibility of preserving the voice beyond the death of the speaker" (2005: 287).  This is, in fact,
visually  apparent  in  what  is  perhaps the  most  recognizable  image of  phonographic  reproduction,  the
Victor Talking Machine Company's trademark.  The well-known image depicts Nipper the dog sitting
obediently before the horn of a gramophone,  listening to a recording of "his  master's  voice."   In its
earliest  versions,  as  Sterne  points  out,  the  phonograph  and  the  dog  rests  on  a  shiny  surface  that
contemporaries had routinely assumed to be the lid of a coffin (2005: 302).  For this reason, theorists like
Friedrich Kittler  make the assumption that  what  attracts  Nipper's  attention is  the sound of his  "dead
master's voice," now preserved forever in the grooved surface of a phonographic disk (1999: 69).  
Although recordings are lifeless derivatives that are to be distinguished from live performance,
they can nevertheless preserve transitory speech beyond the death of the performer.  At the same time,
however, this permanence is also considered to be problematic insofar as a recording, as the preservation
and calcification of some live event, can never say anything novel or provide any new information.  It is
repetitive and redundant to a fault.  As Socrates says of writing, "you might think they spoke as if they
had intelligence, but if you question them…they always say only one and the same thing" (1982: 275d).
Such repetitiveness is also cause for concern in sound recording.  "Music," the composer Roger Sessions
wrote:
ceases  to  have  interest  for  us…the  instant  we  become  aware  of  the  fact  of  literal
repetition, of mechanical reproduction, when we know and can anticipate exactly how a
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given phrase is going to be modeled, exactly how long a given fermata is to be held,
exactly what quality of accent or articulation, of acceleration, or retard, will occur at a
given moment (1950: 70). 
For Sessions, recording ruins music insofar as it turns living, spontaneous performance into something
that is  repetitive, programmed, and entirely predictable.  Theodor Adorno takes this critique one step
further, arguing that the essence of popular music, and not just its recording, is repetition.  According to
Adorno's  analysis,  "the  fundamental  characteristic  of  popular  music,"  which  he  opposes  to  serious
classical  (and  one  should  add  "European")  compositions,  is  'standardization"  (1941:  17).   On  this
account,  popular  songs  are,  like  any other  industrial  product,  assembled  from standard  prefabricated
components that are repeatable and interchangeable.  The result, Adorno suggests, is a form of music that
is unfortunately "rigid and mechanical." (1941: 19).
Third, recordings are, to put it in rather blunt terms, promiscuous bastards10.  The written word,
as Socrates describes it, is an illegitimate offspring that is cut-off from its father (Plato, 1982: 276a).  As
Derrida  characterizes  it,  "writing  is  the  miserable  son.   Le  misérable.   Socrates'  tone  is  sometimes
categorical and condemnatory—denouncing a wayward, rebellious son, and immoderation or perversion
—and sometimes touched and condescending—pitying a defenseless living thing, a son abandoned by his
father"  (1981a:  145).   And  in  being  separated  from  and  abandoned  by  its  progenitor,  writing  is
unavoidably exposed to considerable abuse and misuse.  It "knows not to whom to speak or not to speak "
(Plato, 1982: 275e).  Because of this, Socrates argues, writing is always in need of its absent father's
protection  to  authorize  its  proper  use  and  to  guarantee  its  appropriate  understanding.   The  same
conceptualizations, metaphors, and worries occur with and are evident in the history of audio recording.
According to  Edison, the phonograph allows for the repetition of an original audition at another time
"without the presence or consent of the original source" (1878: 528).  Although Edison believed this to
be a considerable advantage, the music industry, like Socrates, finds it to be nothing but a problem.  In
fact, the rather recent development of copyright law, which begins in both England and the United States
with the Statute of Eight Anne, is motivated by this particular concern.  Copyright, which according Dan
Hunter and Gregory Lastowka "is primarily about acts of  recording and only collaterally about artistic
creativity" (2004: 968), includes stipulations that articulate proper use of recorded material and delineate
what constitutes inappropriate application of the same.  This is done, it is argued, in order to assert the
property rights and moral authority of the legal author over his/her creative product.  It is, to redeploy the
Platonic metaphor, a matter of paternity (Derrida, 1981a: 75-84).  The United States Federal Bureau of
Investigation (FBI), which is charged with investigating criminal infringement of copyright, provides the
following written statement for use on recordings that fall under the protection of U.S. law: "Warning:
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The unauthorized reproduction or distribution of this  copyrighted  work is  illegal.  Criminal  copyright
infringement, including infringement without monetary gain, is investigated by the FBI and is punishable
by up to 5 years in federal prison and a fine of $250,000" (FBI, 2007).  And the Berne Convention for the
Protection of Literary and Artistic  Works ensures the international  property rights  of the author  with
regards to the reproduction, translation, performance, and adaptation of his/her work (WIPO, 1979).  All
of this, whether explicitly acknowledged or not, is informed by Platonic metaphysics and the Socratic
assessment of writing.  Because a recording, like a written document, cannot protect itself, there needs to
be some way to ensure the rights of paternity and to recognize the authority of the author to protect
his/her progeny from misuse and abuse.
The Phaedrus, therefore, is a dialogue that records a particular and influential understanding of
recording technology.  Similar decisions concerning reproduction and reproducibility are reiterated (one
might be tempted to say "reproduced")  with  remarkable  regularity throughout the  history of Western
thought.  It is, for example, manifest in the modern period with Walter Benjamin's influential essay "The
Work  of  Art  in  the  Age  of  Mechanical  Reproduction."   According  to  Benjamin,  advancements  in
mechanical  reproduction,  exemplified  in  particular  by  the  then  new  technologies  of  photography,
phonography, and especially film, provided unprecedented means for  manufacturing reproductions  of
original works of art.  Without making overt reference to the Platonic text, Benjamin, it seems, redeploys
every aspect of the Phaedrus.  "Even the most perfect reproduction of a work of art," Benjamin writes,
"is lacking in one element:  its presence in time and space, its unique existence at the place where it
happens to be…The presence of the original is the prerequisite of the concept of authenticity" (1969:
220).  Benjamin applies the Latin term "aura" (which rather appropriately designates "breath" or "air") to
describe this unique presence and authenticity, and he advances the following thesis: "that which withers
in the age of mechanical reproduction is the aura of the work of art.   This is a symptomatic process
whose  significance  points  beyond  the  realm  of  art"  (1969:  221).   According  to  this  position,  the
mechanisms of photography, phonography, and film create reproductions that are cut-off from the time
and place  of  the  living/breathing original  and  constitute  derived,  lifeless,  and essentially  inauthentic
objects.   Although composed more than 2000 years after  the  Phaedrus,  Benjamin's essay appears  to
reproduce the analyses and decisions that were initially deployed by Plato11.  In making this statement,
however, this analysis conforms to every aspect and stipulation of the Platonic structure that is under
investigation.   Namely, Plato's text  introduces what is  considered to be the original  understanding of
recording technology and subsequent manifestations are determined to be reproductions that are derived
from and secondary to the Platonic prototype.  This insight does not necessarily undermine the analysis
as such but demonstrates, in a very practical sense, the extent to which certain assumptions about the
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status and authority of the "original" are immediately taken for granted in and already predetermine much
of our thinking.
Mash-up and Remix: The Art of Recombinant Rock 'n' Roll
The real breakthrough will come when the data that represent the "recorded" sound are
manipulated as data, in the numerical domain, to later produce something else other than
an analog of the original sound (Rothenbuhler and Peters, 1996: 247)
The  mash-up  manipulates  and  intervenes  in  the  original,  Platonic  understanding  of  recording.   In
particular, it takes aim at and works to undermine every aspect that had been deployed in and mobilized
by the Socratic account provided in the  Phaedrus.   First,  mash-ups complicate and suspend common
assumptions about origin and originality.  This is evident, for example, by the fact that recent attempts to
articulate a genealogy of the mash-up have resulted in a number of apparently incompatible accounts and
lineages.  Mark Vidler, one of the most celebrated mash-up artists, identifies "A Stroke of Genius" as the
initiation  of  the  practice  (Rowley,  2006).   This  composition,  synthesized  in  2001 by Roy Kerr  (aka
Freelance Hellraiser), combines Christina Aguilera's vocal for "Genie in a Bottle" with the Stroke's "Hard
to Explain."  But Kerr was not the first to attempt this kind of sonic recombination.  There are other,
competing accounts  of origination.   Kembrew McLeod traces  the  idea of  the  mash-up to "modernist
collage aesthetic" in general and Pierre Schaeffer's  musique concréte in particular (2005: 81).  He also
identifies Alan Copeland's 1968 "Mission: Impossible Theme/Norwegian Wood," which "plops the vocal
melody of the Beatles" "Norwegian Wood" on top of the Mission Impossible theme song," as one of the
first examples of this kind of 'surgical grafting" in pop music (2005: 85).  William J. Levay, however,
argues that mash-ups really begin with and are an extension of remixing, a turn-table practice introduced
in  Jamaica  in  the  early  1960's.   According  to  Levay,  this  practice,  called  "versioning"  or  "dub,"
constitutes an analog precursor12 to digital  remixing (2005: 7).   As Eric Davis (2006) explains in his
profile of producer Lee 'scratch' Perry, "dub music is a pure artifact of the machine, and has little to do
with earth, flesh, or authenticity.  To create dub, producers and engineers manipulate preexisting tracks
of music recorded in an analog—as opposed to digital—fashion…"  Others,  Will  Hermes (2002) and
Roberta Cruger (2003) for instance, have traced connections between the mash-up, the development of
audio sampling, and the experimental sound art of The Evolution Control Committee and John Oswald's
Plunderphonics.  Considered in this way, mash-ups can be situated as the most recent development in
"musical  quotation," a practice that is evident throughout the history of music and that predates both
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analog  and  digital  recording  technology.   "There  is,"  Kevin  Holm-Hudson  argues,  "an  element  of
borrowing—whether  by  literal  quotation  (of,  for  example,  an  existing  melody)  or  by  generalized
appropriation (e.g.  reference to a stereotyped musical  style)—in every successful  instance of  musical
communication" (1997: 17).  And Wired magazine in their July 2005 issue attempted to circumscribe and
to connect all these practices, gathering them together in the context of a larger social movement that
they named "Cut and Paste Culture."  Consequently, efforts to locate the "first mash-up" or to identify a
unique origin for the practice, no matter the particular medium or technology involved, has precipitated
contentious accounts that remain fundamentally unresolved and often irreducible.  This is not simply a
result of problems with empirical research or available data.  It is a product of the mash-up's fundamental
challenge to the  metaphysical  concept  of  origin,  the assumed value accorded to authenticity, and the
narrative structure that is imposed upon all accounts of genealogy.
Counter to Edison's essentially Platonic assumptions about the phonographic record, a mash-up
does not copy or reproduce an original audio event.  Unlike the book that is carried by Phaedrus, a mash-
up does not consist in the technological reproduction of some original and prior performance.  Instead
mash-ups manufacture copies from copies.  In Mark Vidler's "Ray of Gob," for instance, the vocal from
Madonna's "Ray of Light" is isolated from its rather lush, disco instrumental track and layered on top of
the deliberately abrasive punk music of the Sex Pistol's "Pretty Vacant" and "God Save the Queen."  The
mash-up begins with the Sex Pistol's recognizable arpeggiated guitar introduction and marching rhythm
from "Pretty Vacant."  At the point where one expects Johnny Rotten's vocals to enter the mix with the
famously snarled "There's no point in asking, you'll get no reply" s/he hears instead the highly polished
and somewhat over-produced vocal of Madonna singing "Zepher in the sky at night I wonder."  This
particular  composition exemplifies Vidler's general approach, which he described in a 2006 interview
with Keyboard magazine: "I favor more of a genre clash myself.  I try taking sources from two different
styles  and attempt to create something exciting out of them" (Preve, 2006: 39).  In order to combine
theses two very different and apparently incompatible components, Vidler, like other mash-up artists, not
only needs to understand and pay close attention to the compositional elements of the source material but
also finds it necessary to make minor alterations to them by employing digital audio processing tools
available in software application like Sony's Sound Forge, Digidesign's ProTools, or Audacity, an open
source software project.  According to Vidler:
this is half the fun for me.  Finding combos that shouldn't go together but can—with a bit
of rearranging or gloss.  My unwritten rule is that if you have to detract too much from
the original key or tempo, then it  isn't worth pursuing.  But you can get away with a
slight pitch-shift or increase in tempo…Madonna's vocal for "Ray of Gob" was both sped
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up and re-pitched, but the power of the Pistol's tracks seemed to disguise it  relatively
well (Preve, 2006: 40).  
The result of Vidler's digital data-diddling not only cleverly combines the lyrical content and melody of
the original recordings but also preserves the exact sound and unique inflections of both the Sex Pistol's
guitar-oriented punk music and Madonna's recognizable vocal delivery.  Vidler's mash-up, then, does not
just  sound like Madonna  singing to something that  sounds similar  to the  Sex Pistols,  it  is  Madonna
actually singing to the musical accompaniment of the Sex Pistols even though this collaboration as such
never took place.  Consequently, the "Ray of Gob" recording, which Vidler has distributed in both mp3
format  and  on  vinyl  disk,  is  not  the  documentary  record  of  some  preceding  and  unique  musical
performance.  Instead it simulates a performance that did not, strictly speaking, ever take place as such.
In this way, Vidler is not only able to force the Sex Pistols to accompany Madonna but can, as Scott
Rowley  (2006)  described  it  in  an  article  for  Classic  Rock magazine,  "make  Beyoncé  sing  for  Thin
Lizzy…as well as Freddie Mercury front AC/DC, and Kylie head up the Who."  
This particular practice as it is exemplified here in the work of Mark Vidler is, it is important to
note, neither unique nor original.  That is, one could easily say the same thing about any other mash-up.
DJ Danger Mouse, for instance, created quite a stir by recombining the lyrics of Jay-Z and the music of
the  Beatles,  preserving the distinctive vocal  performance of  the  rapper  as represented  on  The Black
Album and adding it to the classic rock sounds of John, Paul, George, and Ringo as recorded by producer
George Martin.  On The Grey Album's second track, for example, an acapella version of Jay-Z's rather
explicit lyric for "What More Can I Say" is layered on top of an instrumental track that is created by
sampling  and  looping  the  piano-driven  introduction  to  George  Harrison's  "While  My Guitar  Gently
Weeps."  Consequently, there is nothing original in the technique, elements, or results of any particular
mash-up; it is derivative to the core.  To claim that there is anything unique or original in, for example,
Vidler's  work would be to  reinstitute  Platonism at  the  same time that  one endeavors  to  question its
legacy.  One cannot (without engaging in a kind of performative contradiction) make the claim that mash-
ups  question  the  metaphysical  priority  of  originality  and the  traditional  Platonic  distinction  between
generic  form  and  particular  appearance  while  identifying  one  mash-up  or  one  mash-up  "artist"  as
somehow extraordinary and original.  If it is at all possible to differentiate one mash-up from another (a
"good mash-up" from a "bad mash-up," for instance) it will need to be on the basis of an entire different
aesthetic  formula,  one  that  no  longer  deploys,  utilizes,  or  is  informed  by  the  traditional  Platonic
structures.  Although there are a number of theorists whose work would qualify for this kind of post-
Platonic aesthetics, the one thinker who is perhaps best situated to provide an understanding of the mash-
up is Jean Baudrillard.  Despite the fact that Baudrillard appears to avoid dealing with audio and sound
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reproduction13, his treatment of the concept "simulation" provides a compelling description that can be
repurposed to explicate mash-ups and their cultural significance.  "Simulation," Baudrillard writes in his
seminal essay by the same name, "is no longer that of a territory, a referential being or a substance.  It is
the generation by models of a real without origin or reality: a hyperreal" (1992: 1).  With simulation,
then, we are no longer operating on the terrain that had been defined by Platonic metaphysics, where the
copy, the simulacrum, is understood as being derived from and secondary to an original that precedes and
determines it.   According to Baudrillard,  simulation intervenes in this system and radically alters the
rules of the game.  "As simulacra, images precede the real to the extent that they invert the causal and
logical order of the real and its reproduction" (Baudrillard, 1988: 13).  This is precisely what a mash-up,
like Vidler's "Ray of Gob," affects in sound.  In mixing, for example, Madonna's vocals with the music of
the Sex Pistols, "Ray of Gob" intervenes in the established system of recording, radically altering the
established rules of the game.  And this is, as Vidler himself points out, what makes the mash-up both
interesting and culturally  significant.   Like the  predominantly  visual  simulacra  that  are  described  by
Baudrillard, the mash-up participates in an overturning of the assumed causal and logical order that had
been operative in the metaphysics of recording since the Phaedrus.  The mash-up, then, is nothing less
than the sound of simulation.
Second, mash-ups are exceedingly and unapologetically redundant.  For this reason, they appear
to be beyond traditional strategies of recuperation, all of which, not surprisingly, deploy and conform to
the  Platonic  original.   Lee  Brown,  for  instance,  tries  to  make  a  legitimate  case  for  the  inherent
redundancy and repeatability in jazz records by arguing that "the detail made available by recordings can
increase our understanding and appreciation of the living thing" (2000: 124).  In advancing this particular
argument, Brown not only mobilizes Plato's biological metaphor and the unquestioned privilege that has
customarily been accorded to the "live event" but also deploys Adorno's terminology, which idealizes the
unique "life relationship of the details" (2000: 18) that is constitutive of all serious musical compositions.
Although  it  may  be  possible  to  situate  and  even  validate  the  mash-up  by  employing  this  kind  of
argumentation—i.e. one could perhaps make the argument that a mash-up re-animates one's appreciation
for the original music and even creates new markets for the source material and the artists who created it
—its effects are actually much more pronounced and fundamental.  In extracting the vocal track from one
recorded pop song and layering it on top of music from another, the mash-up does nothing more than
substitute  and  reconfigure  prefabricated  materials14.   The  mash-up,  in  fact,  seems  to  prove  Adorno
correct, when he writes: 
The  beginning  of  the  chorus  is  replaceable  by  the  beginning  of  innumerable  other
choruses. The interrelationship among the elements or the relationship of the elements to
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the whole would be unaffected.   In Beethoven,  position is important  only in a living
relation between a concrete totality and its concrete parts.  In popular music, position is
absolute. Every detail is substitutable; it serves its function only as a cog in a machine
(1941: 18).  
The mash-up constitutes an extreme form of this mechanical substitutability and replication that
Adorno attributes to all popular forms of music.  In fact, mash-up artists seem to repurpose Adorno's
indictment  as  if  it  were  an  instruction  manual,  deliberately  substituting  one  chorus  for  another  and
rearranging details without regard for the original integrity of the whole15.  Consequently, the mash-up, as
if following the advice of Slavoj Žižek, "fully endorses what it is accused of" (2000: 2).  That is, it does
not contest repeatability and interchangeability with arguments that still, in one way or another, validate
and  value  originality  as  such.   Instead,  mash-ups,  like  Mark  Vidler's  "Ray  of  Gob"  or  Freelance
Hellraiser's "A Stroke of Genius," redeploys and reduplicates such redundancy, pushes it to its extreme
limit, and produces something "original" (although this term is no longer entirely appropriate) from out
of these repetitive and essentially interchangeable components.  Like pop art, the mash-up comprehends
and redeploys every aspect of repetitive industrial practice to (re)produce highly innovative products that,
although not "original" in the usual sense of the word, resist  being reduced to mere resemblance and
redundancy.   The  mash-up,  therefore,  participates  in  a  reconfiguration  of  "repetition"  that,  similar
(although not the same) to the theorizing of Gilles Deleuze, introduces a new concept of repetition that
does not simply repeat and reaffirm the original Platonic privileging of the unique original.  Although
Deleuze's analysis is not concerned with the particularities of recorded music, we can, practicing a kind
of mash-up approach, extract the following from his text and add it to the mix: "In the infinite movement
of degraded likeness from copy to copy, we reach a point at which everything changes nature, at which
copies themselves flip over into simulacra and at which, finally, resemblance or spiritual imitation gives
way to repetition" (1994: 128)16. 
Third,  mash-ups  question  and  undermine  authority.   According  to  the  original  Socratic
assessment,  written  words  are,  as  Derrida  (1981a:  76-77)  points  out,  characterized  as  "orphans"  or
"bastards"  that  are essentially  cut-off from paternal  authority.   It is  for  this reason that  Socrates  and
Phaedrus not only have access to the speech of Lysias beyond the latter's actual presence but can, as
Socrates himself does, repurpose Lysias's words, jamming and remixing them in such a way as to make
them say things Lysias himself may not have intended or authorized.  Once written, every word can, as
Socrates  points  out,  "be  bandied  about"  (Plato,  1982:  275d).   Similarly  the  mash-up  is  regarded  as
"bastard pop" (Cruger,  2003;  Newitz,  2004).  It is the monstrous outcome of illegitimate fusions and
promiscuous reconfigurations of recorded music that deliberately exceed the comprehension, control, and
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proper authority of the "original artist."  In doing so, however, the mash-up does not just challenge the
authority of the author but demonstrates that the concept of authorship in popular music has itself always
been equivocal and something of an artifice.  "Critics have," as Jesse Walker points out, "long debated
who 'creates' a pop record: the artist listed on the sleeve, the producer behind the scenes, the composer in
the wings, or the sometimes anonymous studio employees who actually play the music" (2003: 57).  The
mash-up, therefore, does not so much violate authorship as it exploits and demonstrates that the concept
of authorship has always been a construct that has its own history, assumptions, and political interests.  In
making this demonstration, however, the mash-up inevitably butts  up against  and violates intellectual
property law.  Mash-ups are not just unauthorized; they are without a doubt illegal.  "A copyright holder's
rights," as Hunter and Lastowka summarize it, "include the right to prohibit new works that incorporate
bits and pieces of prior works as well as works that are derivative of prior works" (2004: 985-986).  In
reusing and repurposing other people's intellectual property, the mash-up is in clear violation of existing
copyright law and is exposed to both criminal prosecution and civil litigation.  For this reason, mash-up
artists are "constantly dodging lawyers' cease and desist orders" (Newitz, 2004; Hunter and Lastowka,
2004) and playing an elaborate game of chicken with the authorities, whether they be law enforcement
agencies or industry organizations, such as the Recording Industry Association of America (RIAA).  And
the recent appearance of authorized mash-ups, like the collaboration between Jay-Z and Linkin Park or
Vidler's  Mashed CD, do little or nothing to alter this situation.  In fact, the authorized mash-up often
requires,  as  the  press  release  for  Mashed describes  it,  "a  clearance  process  of  biblical  proportions"
(Vidler, 2007).  With authorized mash-ups, then, lawyers enter the mix and join in the creative process.
In fact, it would be difficult to decide which aspect of these projects manifest the greater artistic skill, the
audio  remixing or the complex licensing agreements  and legal  remixes  that  make these  "authorized"
versions possible. 
Conclusion
One could look askance at  mash-ups, viewing them as puerile,  disrespectful  mucking
about  with  other  people's  property,  but  one  could  also  celebrate  that  very  puerility
insofar  as it  is  anti-oedipal—insofar as it  short-circuits the culture industry's normally
enforced boundaries between disparate genres of music (Gunderson, 2004: 1).
Mash-ups are a contentious cultural  practice  that  clearly has a polarizing effect.   For opponents  and
critics, the mash-up is definitely puerile and patently criminal.  It consists of an illegal appropriation and
illegitimate fusion of plundered materials that violates both copyright law and existing industry standards
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and practices.   A mash-up like  The Grey Album rips-off  "some of the most  valuable  property in  the
history of pop music" (Gunderson, 2004: 10) and the authorities have responded, not surprisingly, by
capitalizing on every available legal remedy.  For fans and advocates, however, mash-ups constitute a
new and potentially revolutionary development in contemporary music.  According to McLeod, mash-ups
"follow the deconstructionist method"17 and "undermine, disrupt, and displace the arbitrary hierarchies of
taste that rule popular music" (2005: 83-84).18  Despite this positive spin, however, McLeod is careful not
to  idealize  the  mash-up  and,  in  qualifying  his  position,  ends  up  deploying  the  same  metaphysical
structures and values that are used by opponents and critics.
Despite my appreciation for them, I do not mean to idealize mash-ups because, as a form
of  creativity,  they  are  quite  limited  and limiting.   First,  because  they depend  on  the
recognizability  of  the  original,  mash-ups  are  circumscribed  to  a  relatively  narrow
repertoire of Top 40 pop songs.  Also, mash-ups pretty much demonstrate that Theodore
Adorno, the notoriously cranky Frankfurt School critic of pop culture, was right about
one key point.  In arguing for the superiority of European art music, Adorno claimed that
pop  songs  were  simplistic  and  merely  made  from  easily  interchangeable,  modular
components.  Yes, Adorno was a snob; but after hearing a half dozen mash-ups, it is hard
to deny that his is right about that particular point (2005: 86). 
For both opponents and advocates, the mash-up is situated and understood by redeploying, often without
any critical hesitation whatsoever, a metaphysics of recording that is at least as old as Plato.  Although
articulating what  appears  to be diametrically  opposed opinions,  both sides of the debate  rely on and
leverage similar  assumptions and values—originality, creativity, authenticity, etc.  And in either case,
whether  the  spin  is  negative  or  positive,  the  mash-up  is  ultimately  associated  with  that  strange
apocalyptic  tone  that  is  all-too-often  attributed  to  postmodernism.   The  mash-up  is,  as  McLeod
concludes, "yet another sign of the end of the world, proof that our culture has withered and run out of
ideas" (2005: 86).  Such conformity with the Platonic tradition has the obvious advantage of providing
current and future examinations of the mash-up with a tested and secure foundation that is considered to
be "correct," "appropriate," and "unquestionable."  As long as examinations conform to this structure, we
already know what debates are possible,  what questions should be asked, what answers will count as
appropriate, and what stories can be told.  Despite the obvious advantages that come from adhering to
Platonism,  however,  there  is  at  least  one  good  reason  to  remain  skeptical  of  this  tradition  and  its
controlling  influence.   In  particular,  the  evaluation  of  the  technology  of  writing  that  is  originally
advanced in the Phaedrus is itself something that is paradoxically recorded and made available to us in
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and  by  writing  (Lentz,  1983).   As  Jacques  Derrida  describes  this  rather  curious  and  potentially
contradictory maneuver, "Plato imitates the imitators in order to restore the truth of what they imitate:
namely,  truth  itself"  (1981a:  112).19  For  this  reason,  what  is  described  in  the  Phaedrus  concerning
recording technology appears to be put in question by the way in which it provides its descriptions.  This
apparently contradictory circumstance, whereby the operations of the text already violate the statements
made in the text and vice versa, renders much of what had been recorded in the Phaedrus debatable and
suspicious.   The  opportunity  here  should  be  obvious.   Instead  of  simply  reproducing  or  replaying
Platonism,  which  would  require,  among other  things,  that  one either  ignore  this  textual  difficulty  or
discount it as a mere "technicality," we can endeavor to proceed otherwise.  
This is  where  the  mash-up comes in.   The mash-up, what  William Gibson describes  as "the
characteristic pivot at the turn of our two centuries" (2005: 118), deliberately intervenes in this tradition,
releasing a fundamental challenge to Platonism and its metaphysics of recording.  Instead of being simply
reducible  to or comprehended by the Platonic privileging of originality and authenticity, the mash-up
deliberately involves itself in and toys with derivation, plagiarism, inauthenticity, promiscuity, repetition
—things that from the Platonic perspective can only appear to be negative, monstrous,  deficient,  and
perverse.  It would, however, be inaccurate and potentially self-contradictory to say that the mash-up in
general or any one mash-up in particular originates or causes this.  For there is, strictly speaking, nothing
original in or about the mash-up.  True to its thoroughly derivative, illegitimate, and monstrous nature,
mash-ups cannot be said to innovate anything.  Instead, they only plunder, reuse, and remix aberrations
that are already available in and constitutive of recording theory and practice.  Take for instance, Evan
Eisenberg's comment concerning the word "record," which is offered in his book The Recording Angel, a
title that makes deliberate reference to the Deutsche Grammophon trademark picturing a cherub with an
oversized  stylus  inscribing  the  surface  of  a  phonographic  disk.   "The  word  'record'  is  misleading,"
Eisenberg writes.  "Only live recordings record an event; studio recordings, which are the great majority,
record nothing.  Pieced together from bits of actual events, they construct an ideal event.  They are like
the composite photograph of a minotaur" (2005:  89).  Although there may be instances where sound
recording functions,  as Edison himself intended, in a documentary mode, like the live recording of a
concert performance or the preservation efforts of ethnomusicologists like Alan Lomax, the majority of
recordings are created and work otherwise.  As Eisenberg points out, studio recordings, especially of
popular  music,  actually  record  nothing.   Instead  they  manufacture,  often  through  clever  studio
manipulations  and various  technological  artifice,  what  it  is  we presume they record.   Consequently,
recording is, from the very beginning, inextricably involved in simulation.  To make matters worse, live
performance  is  itself  a  product  of  recording.   Practically  speaking,  "live  music,"  especially  as  it  is
understood  in  rock and  other  popular  forms,  is  not  some immediate  original  sound  that  precedes  a
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particular  band's recording efforts.  Instead a band's live performances often endeavor as Steve Jones
argues, "to imitate its recording," providing a sound in the concert hall that is as close as possible to what
was created for  and heard on the recording (1992:  59).   As Jacques  Attali  describes  it,  "concerts  of
popular music, tours by artists, are now all too often nothing more than copies of the records" (2003:
118).   Or  as  Sterne  concludes  in  a  phrase  that  sounds  surprisingly close  to  Baudrillard's  theorizing,
"reproduction  precedes  originality"  (2005:  221).   The  mash-up,  therefore,  does  not  introduce  these
fundamental challenges into the metaphysics of recording but plunders and remixes them in such a way
that they can be heard over all the noise that is currently being made about sound recording, intellectual
property, and digital technology.
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Notes
[1] The mash-up, it is important to note, is not restricted to the field of recorded music.  There are also
graphic  and  video  mash-ups,  which  manipulate  and  recombine  visual  information,  and  "data
mash-ups," which comprise the foundation of both the Semantic Web and Web 2.0.  With data
mash-ups, information from one web resource, like restaurant reviews for a particular region, are
combined with  data  from another  resource,  like geographical  information,  in order  to  present
users with unique and integrated content.  The technology that makes this possible includes the
World  Wide Web Consortium's (W3C)  Resource  Description  Framework (RDF) standard and
markup languages, such as XML (extensible markup language), which describes actual content
rather than the appearance of content.  Although data mash-ups and audio mash-ups share similar
conceptual and technical features, this essay will only address the former.
[2] Grey Tuesday took place on 24 February 2004 and was coordinated by Downhill Battle, a music
activist organization.  For more information on the protest, its effects, and a list of participating
websites, see http://www.greytuesday.org.  For more on Downhill Battle, see
http://www.downhillbattle.org/
[3] Information on the contest and its outcome can be found at 
           http://www.davidbowie.com/neverFollow/
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[4] According to the ad-copy for the CD, "Mash-ups are usually associated with underground record
shops, bootleg white-labels and mixtapes changing hands between those in the know.  Now, EMI
has decided to change all of that and after a clearance process of biblical proportions, bring these
explosions of creativity, and massive cut-up tracks to the masses – legally" (Vidler, 2007).
[5] It is customary in the introduction to an article to provide an explicit articulation of method.  In
order to honor and yet bracket this often unquestioned procedure, which itself is informed by a
particular  metaphysical  narrative,  I  relegate  this  material  to  a  note.   If  pressed  to  provide  an
articulation of method, I would have to say, borrowing a terminology that Slavoj Žižek (2004: 46-
47) appropriates from Gilles Deleuze (1995: 6), that what I do here is "bugger" Platonism with
contemporary innovations in audio recording and digital  media in order  to produce disturbing
bastards and monstrous off-spring.  This "philosophical practice of buggery" (Žižek 2004: 46) is
related  to  and  could  also  be  described  as  a  kind  of  intellectual  mash-up—an  unauthorized
concatenation and remix of different source material that produces noisy and monstrous progeny,
which demonstrate  alternative configurations  and possibilities.   This "monstrous practice" will
become immediately evident in the seemingly unjustifiable and noisy mix of materials that come
to be included in the course of the essay.  In investigating the mash-up, this essay samples and
remixes  material  extracted  from  Plato,  Theodore  Adorno,  Jean  Baudrillard,  Thomas  Edison,
Gilles Deleuze, Jacques Derrida, and others with what might appear to be little or no attention to
the  integrity  and  context  of  the  original  work.   From a  certain  perspective,  one that  has  the
approval of the Platonic tradition and that does not question its original privilege of originality,
this procedure can only be interpreted as a deficient and less than respectable practice.  At the
same time, however, this is precisely what characterizes the mash-up, which not only comprises
the subject addressed by the essay but constitutes the method to which the essay itself is and must
be subjected.  In pointing this out, however, I am not claiming that there is anything original,
clever, or unique in this particular practice.  In fact, the sampling and mixing together of different
sources in the process of authoring a new composition is itself a standard operating procedure in
writing.   It  is  what  Dick  Hebdige  calls  (by  way of  a  citation  and  transposition  of  an  audio
recording practice attributed to Caribbean music) "versioning."  And here I quote Hebdige for
reasons he himself explains: "That's what a quotation in a book or on record is.  It's an invocation
of someone else's voice to help you say what you want to say.  In order to e-voke you have to be
able to in-voke.  And every time the other voice is borrowed in this way, it is turned away slightly
from what  it  was the original author or singer or musician thought they were saying, singing,
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playing" (2000: 14).  This essay, therefore, following the example of the subject matter that it
investigates and employing a practice that is already operative in scholarly writing, quotes from a
diversity of sources and mixes them together in a version that is not, strictly speaking, an exact
reproduction of the original work but is, to quote the words of Hebdige, "turned away slightly"
from the "original."
[6] Plato's Phaedrus was presumably composed in 370 BCE and is considered to be a contemporary
of the author's two major works  Republic and Symposium.  Although usually read as a dialogue
about rhetoric and the art of speaking, the Phaedrus contains, as I argue here, what is probably the
first  recorded debate about recording technology.  For the ancient Greeks, this technology was
writing, a recently introduced innovation that allowed one to record, to preserve, and to replay
spoken discourse.  The Phaedrus, then, occupies a curious position, recording in and by writing a
debate  about  the  social  impact  and  effect  of  the  new recording  technology of  writing.   This
particular  reading  of  the  Phaedrus is  indebted  to  Jacques  Derrida's  "Plato's  Pharmacy"  in
Dissemination (1981a), Walter Ong's Orality and Literacy (1995), and John Sallis's "Beyond the
City:  Phaedrus" in  Being and Logos (1996).  For a more detailed investigation of this dialogue
and its significance for contemporary understandings of recording technology, see my Thinking
Otherwise: Philosophy, Communication, Technology (2007).
[7] The ancient Greek word τέχνη (transliterated techne) is usually translated as "art" and denotes "a
system or method of making or doing" (Liddel and Scott, 1991: 804); it is the etymological root of
the English words "technique" and "technology."  
[8]  For Jacques Derrida,  the myth of Theuth and Thamus that is recounted toward the end of the
Phaedrus is understood to be constitutive of the logocentric privilege that he argues characterizes
mainstream Western  thinking,  and his  essay "Plato's  Pharmacy"  traces  the  way this  particular
legend functions within this tradition.  For Neil Postman the story is interpreted as articulating
both the problems of and possible solutions for an increasingly technological society.  And he
begins  his  book,  Technopoly:  The  Surrender  of  Culture  to  Technology,  by  recalling  "The
Judgment of Thamus" and extracting from it "several sound principles from which we may begin
to learn how to think with wise circumspection about a technological society." (1993: 4)
[9] See, for example, Steve Wurtzler's (1992) critical investigation of lip syncing. 
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[10] On the importance of the "bastard" in contemporary philosophy, see David Farrell Krell's  The
Purest of Bastards: Works of Mourning, Art, and Affirmation in the Thought of Jacques Derrida
(2000).
[11] Walter Benjamin's essay, "The Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction," is often
interpreted  as  an indictment  against  technologically  enabled  forms  of  reproduction.   A more
generous and sophisticated reading has been provided by Jonathan Sterne in  The Audible Past.
"At first blush," Sterne writes, "Benjamin appears to advance the 'loss of being' hypothesis since
he coins the term aura as 'that which withers in the age of mechanical reproduction'" (2005: 34).
Interpreted in this way, Benjamin would appear to be the perfect Platonist, positing supreme value
in the aura of the original and lamenting its unfortunate destitution in mechanically reproduced
copies.   But  Sterne  finds  this  reading  to  be  inattentive  to  the  text  under  consideration.
Specifically, he argues, it ignores a note that Benjamin included early in the essay:  "Precisely
because  authenticity  is  not  reproducible,  the  intensive  penetration  of  certain  (mechanical)
processes  of  reproduction  was  instrumental  in  differentiating  and  grading  authenticity"
(Benjamin, 1969: 243).  "In this formulation," Sterne writes, "the very construct of aura is, by and
large, retroactive, something that is an artifact of reproducibility, rather than a side effect or an
inherent  quality  of  self-presence.   Aura  is  the  object  of  a  nostalgia  that  accompanies
reproduction." (2005: 36)  Understood in this fashion, Benjamin's work would need to be situated
closer to the innovations that come to be introduced by Baudrillard instead of being interpreted as
a mere mechanistic reproduction of Platonism.  
[12] On "versioning" and "dub," see Dick Hebdige's seminal investigation in  Cut 'n' Mix: Culture,
Identity and Caribbean Music (2000) 
[13]  By his  own account,  Baudrillard  excludes  audio  as  an  explicit  object  of  consideration.   In
response  to  an  interviewer's  question  about  sound,  Baudrillard  provided  the  following
explanation: "I have some difficulty replying to this question because sound, the sphere of sound,
the acoustic sphere, audio, is really more alien to me than the visual" (1997: 49).  Consequently, it
looks as if Baudrillard says little or nothing about sound and sound recording.  Even a cursory
reading of his texts, demonstrates an overwhelming interest in visual artifacts and techniques, a
rhetorical  style that is dependent on metaphors and tropes derived from optics,  and the use of
examples  that  involve  vision  and  aim to  make theory  visible.   This  visual  orientation  is  not
something that is unique to Baudrillard but is part and parcel of a long and venerable tradition
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within western thinking.  "The concept of ideology," W. J. T. Mitchell writes, "is grounded, as the
word suggests,  in the notion of mental entities or 'ideas' that provide the materials of thought.
Insofar as these ideas are understood as images—as pictorial, graphic signs imprinted or projected
on the medium of  consciousness—then ideology is  really an iconology,  a theory of imagery"
(1987: 164).  This iconographic orientation produces, as audio theorists like Jacques Attali point
out, something of a blind spot, when it comes to thinking about and theorizing sound (2003: 1).
The blindness is not, we could say following Baudrillard, a lack of vision, but the effect of an
excessive  visibility  and  extreme  dedication  to  the  image  and  the  imaginary.   To  say  that
Baudrillard simply ignores sound and sound recording, however, is inaccurate and not attentive to
his published writings.  As Mike Gane points out, Baudrillard is "haunted" by a certain concern
with music, specifically "the technical perfection of musical reproduction." (2000: 60).  For this
reason, one can re-read Baudrillard as an audio theorist even if his own remarks appear to exclude
this possibility.  I undertake such an examination, applying Baudrillard's work to an interpretation
of audio recording and the cultural practice of the mash-up, in "Blind Faith: Baudrillard, Fidelity,
and Recorded Sound" (2007).  
[14] In stating this, I do not mean to suggest that this feature is in any way a distinctive or unique
characteristic  of  the  mash-up.   Here  again,  the  mash-up is  exceedlingly  and  unapologetically
derivative.   As  Kevin  Holm-Hudson  (1997)  points  out,  "the  act  of  quotation  in  music  (here
defined as reproducing a melodic, stylistic or timbral excerpt of a pre-existing musical work in the
new  context  of  another  musical  work)  is  arguably  ageless  and  instinctual"  (p.  17).   Blues
musicians, for example, often borrow from and amalgamate familiar material into new shapes and
configurations (Evans 1982), hybirds like afro-cuban jazz remix seemingly disparate sources into
new and sometimes surprising compositions, and even composers of classical music often quote
from  and  incorporate  elements  taken  from  easily  recognizable  and  previously  available
compositions, whether folks melodies as in the case of Bartok's  Hungarian Sketches or popular
jazz tropes as evidenced in Shostakovich's  Jazz Suites.  Consequently, the mash-up, true to its
thoroughly derivative nature, does not innovate the practice of musical appropriation, quotation,
and recombination but extends, exploits, and plunders it.
[15]  Mash-ups  do  not  in  any  way  disprove  Adorno  or  contest  his  admittedly  unsympathetic
assessment  of  popular  music.   In fact,  the  mash-up proves  Adorno correct—popular  music  is
characterized by substitutability, repetition, or what Dick Hebdige calls "versioning" (2000: 12-
14).  Rather than directly oppose Adorno on this point with arguments to the contrary, the mash-
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up agrees with Adorno against himself.  For Adorno substitutability and repetition are, following
the original Platonic position, essentially negative, deficient, and derivative.  The mash-up does
not contest this point, it simply begins from and operates with a different set of ontological and
moral  assumptions.   For  the  mash-up,  repetition  and  substitutability  are  not  presumed  to  be
deficiencies;  they  are  celebrated  as  positive  qualities.   Mash-ups,  therefore,  do  not  disprove
Adorno,  dispute  his  aesthetic  insight,  or  turn  his  critique  on its  head.   On the contrary, they
demonstrate that his evaluation is absolutely correct.  What is different are the ontological and
axiological assumptions that already structure the analysis and constrain his conclusions.
[16] The occurrence of the word 'simulacra" in this context begs the question, what is the relationship
between Gilles Deleuze's and Jean Baudrillard's understanding and use of this term?  Although
there is an important affinity here that exceeds linguistic coincidence, there are also important
conceptual differences.  Brian Massumi, for instance, argues that both Baudrillard and Deleuze
(and Deleuze and Guattari by extension) understand "simulation" as a critical interruption in the
structure of Platonic metaphysics.  "A common definition of the simulacrum," Massumi writes,
"is a copy of a copy whose relation to the model has become so attenuated that it can no longer
properly be said to be a copy" (1987:  91).   According to Massumi's reading, Baudrillard  and
Deleuze agree on at least this much.  Where they differ, however, is on the question of the "reality
of the model" and the moral significance attributed to the concept of simulation.  Massumi argues
that Baudrillard's writings provide no suitable answer to the former.  "Baudrillard sidesteps the
question of whether simulation replaces a real that did indeed exist, or if simulation is all there
has ever been.  Deleuze and Guattari say yes to both" (1987: 92).  Furthermore, Massumi finds
Baudrillard  to  be  something  of  a  pessimist.   "The  work  of  Baudrillard  is  one  long  lament,"
Massumi writes, "Baudrillard's framework can only be the result of a nostalgia for the old reality
so intense that it has deformed his vision of everything outside it" (1987: 95).  Whereas Deleuze
and Guattari, following the precedent of Friedrich Nietzsche, are characterized otherwise, looking
upon simulation not as a sad and gloomy loss of some original reality but as a new and promising
opportunity.   "What  Deleuze  and  Guattari  offer,"  Massumi  concludes,  "is  a  logic  capable  of
grasping Baudrillard's failing world of representation as an effective illusion the demise of which
opens  a glimmer of  possibility" (1987:  96).   Although Massumi's argument is  persuasive and
easily distinguishes these two thinkers of simulation, his differentiation employs an unfortunate
and not altogether accurate caricature of Baudrillard.  Although there are passages in Baudrillard's
texts that can sound "negative" and "nostalgic" in the way that Massumi describes it, Baudrillard's
own understanding of simulation is much more complex and varied.  A better, albeit considerably
22
Popular Music and Society
less decisive, approach to understanding the points of contact and differentiation can be found in
Daniel W. Smith's essay "The Concept of Simulation: Deleuze and the Overturning of Platonism"
(2006).  Smith not only casts a wider net but allows for a much more nuanced understanding of
the problem.  "The concept  of the  simulacrum, along with its  variants (simulation,  similitude,
simultaneity, dissimulation), has a complex history within twentieth-century French thought.  The
notion was developed primarily in the work of three thinkers—Pierre Klossowski, Gilles Deleuze,
and Jean Baudrillard—although each of them conceived of the notion in different yet original
ways, which must be carefully distinguished from each other…It would thus be possible to write a
philosophical  history  of  the  notion  of  simulacrum, tracing  out  the  intrinsic  permutations  and
modifications of the concept.  In such a history, as Deleuze writes, 'it's not a matter of bringing all
sorts of things under a single concept, but rather of relating each concept to the variables that
explain  its  mutations.'   Such  a  history,  however,  still  remains  to  be  written."  (2006:  89-90).
Consequently, what can be said at this particular juncture is that there are important affinities and
crucial differences in the thinking of simulation in the work of Baudrillard and Deleuze, and that
the account of this interaction can only be addressed in the context of a comprehensive reading of
the history of philosophy that has yet to be articulated.
[17]  McLeod's  use  of  the  phrase  "deconstructionist  method"  is  problematic,  mainly  because
"deconstruction," as it was described and practiced by Jacques Derrida, does not constitute what
is usually defined and characterized as a "method."  "Methods," as Rodophe Gasché explains, "are
generally understood as roads (from hodos: "way," "road") to knowledge.  In the sciences, as well
as the philosophies that scientific thinking patronizes, method is an instrument for representing a
given field, and it is applied to that field from the outside.  That is, it is on the side of the subject
and is an external reflection of the object" (1986: 121).  This is problematic for an understanding
of deconstruction precisely because deconstruction, as it was described by and exemplified in the
writings  of  Derrida,  constitutes  a  general  strategy  for  intervening  in  these  and  every  other
traditional metaphysical opposition (e.g. inside/outside, subject/object, theory/practice, etc.).  For
more on deconstruction, see the interviews with Derrida collected in Positions (1981b), Gasché's
The Tain of the Mirror (1986), Briankle Chang's  Deconstructing Communication, and my own
"Deconstruction for Dummies" in Hacking Cyberspace (2001).
[18] In advancing this position, McLeod follows a maneuver that is well established in contemporary
interdisciplinary  research.   Although  he  did  not  invent  the  procedure,  George  Landow's
Hypertext: The Convergence of Contemporary Critical Theory and Technology provides one of
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the earliest examples.  According to Landow, "critical theory promises to theorize hypertext and
hypertext promises to embody and thereby test theory" (1992: 3).  In demonstrating this thesis,
Landow,  like  McLeod,  creates  a  mash-up,  sampling  and  recombining  research  in  computer
science with recent developments in literary theory.
[19] This is one of those places where, one could argue, Platonism is already (in) deconstruction and
vice versa.  For as Christopher Norris describes it, "deconstruction is the vigilant seeking-out of
those "aproias," blind spots or moments of self-contradiction where a text involuntarily betrays
the tension between rhetoric and logic, between what it manifestly  means to say and what it is
nonetheless constrained to mean." (1982: 1).  For a detailed consideration of deconstruction and
the work of Plato, see Michael Naas's Turning: From Persuasion to Philosophy (1995).
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